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SEND ORIGINAL TO:

COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O.

BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLAINT
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS

CLATh1ANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER

Joseph Henry
16226 Lonkey Lane
Caldwell, Idaho 83607

Richard S. Owen
P.O. Box 278
Nampa, Idaho 83653

TELEPHONEl'-.'UMBER:

208-455-2713

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

(at time of injury)

Department of Correction
Statehouse Mail
Boise, Idaho 83720-0000
CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720
CLATh1ANT'S BIRTHDATE

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

11115/09
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED

WHEN INJURED, CLATh1ANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

Idaho, Ada County

OF:

$636.80, PURSUANT TO

IDAHO CODE § 72-419

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPEl\TED)

I was walking fast to my post in cold weather and over exerted myself
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

I suffered a heart attack.
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THlS TIME?

Compensability of the case.
-;:

DATE ON WHlCH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER

TO WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN

11115/09

Supervisor

HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

o WRITTEN

[g] ORAL

o OTHER PLEASE SPECIFY

ISStJE OR ISSUES INVOLVED

Compensability of case; determination of need for medical
care and reimbursement for the cost thereof; assessment of
attorney's fees for unreasonable denial of medical care;
determination of extent of total temporary disability
benefits, need for retraining, determination of permanent
partial impairment; determination of permanent partial
disability which may be total and permanent which accounts
for all medical and non-medical factors and retention of
jurisdiction past the statute of limitations.
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLATh1PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW ORA COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS?

0

YES

[g] NO IF SO, PLEASE STATE WHY.

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH
IDAHO CODE § 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM I.C. 1002
ICIOOl (Rev. 1/01/2004)

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)
Appendix 1

Complaint - Page 1 o~

pHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT (NAME

Dr. Mark Parent
6140 W. Curtisian, Ste. 200
Boise, Idaho 83704
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVB YOU JNCURRED TO DATE?

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAlD, IF ANY? $ Unknown

WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVB YOU PAID, IF ANY? $

!RI YES 0 NO

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.
SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT OR ATTORNEY

DATE

~L~
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATII BENEFITS
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY
FILING COMPLAINT

I

DATE OF DEATH

I

r-

WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED?
DYES

RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT

DID FILJNG PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT?

ONO

DYES

ONO

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN M'D DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

b

day of April, 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon:

EMPLOYER'S NAME ANTI ADDRESS

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Department of Correction

State Insurance Fund

Statehouse Mail

P.O. Box 83720

Boise. Idaho 83720

Boise, Idaho 83720

via:

o

via:

personal service of process

X regular U.S. Mail

o

personal service of process

X regular U.S. Mail

Signature

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must me an Answer on Form I.e. 1003
with the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!
Further infonnation maybe obtained from: fudustrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000.
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORM ON PAGE 3)
Complaint - Page 2 of 3

TRIAL
3720
ID
720-0041

aJdweU ID 83607

(pr().';der Use Only)
1tdlc.al Record umber:,-::---:-_ _ _ _ __
o Pick up opi 0 Fo Copl

HEALTH

n.n;, r>T'>

I hereby authorize _-..,._,-_ _ _ __=-:---.,.----,--- - - - t o disclose health information as specified:
Provider lime - must bl! specific for Melt pro..cdl'!1"

o:_ ___~---~--,-~--__,_----=_=~-~=_~--=~~-------------Insurance Company/J'hird Party Administrator/Self Insured EmployerffSlF. their attorneys or patient 's attorney
Srreet Address
Zip Code

State

City
Purpo e or De d for dat
(c.g. Workc:r's Compensation Claim )

Date( ) of Ho pitalization/ are:______ _ _ _ _ __
Inform tion to b di clo d :
Discharge Summary
History & Physical Exam
o
onsultation Reports
o Operative Reports
o Lab
o Pathology
o Radiology Reports
o Entire Record
o Olber: Specify_ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ __
I under tand that the di clo ure may include information relating to (check ifapplicable):
o AIDSorillV
o Psychiatric or Mental Health Information
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164)
and that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal
regulations. I understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer
except that revoking the authorization won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I
understand that the provider will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing
this authorization. nl
otherwise rl!Voked, this authoriuItion wiII expire upon r olution or worker compen aJion
cJaim. Provider, its employees, officers, copy service contractor and physicians are bereby released from any legal
responsibility or liability for disclosure of the abo e information to the e>..1:ent indicated and authorized by me on this form
and as outlined in the otice of Privacy. My signature below authorizes release of all information pecified in this
Any questions that I have regarding disclosnre may be directed to the pri acy officer of the Provider

o
ignature of Legal Representative & Relation hip to PatUntlAulhority to Act

Dale

ignature of W'Une

Date

Original: Medical Record

Title
Copy. Patient

omplljnl - Page 3 of 3

SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMM'

2009·029710

, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX 83720,

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT

I.C. NO. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

o

IDAHO 83720-0041

11/15/09

INJURY DATE_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

X The named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS
Joseph Henry
16226 Lonkey Ln.
Caldwell, ID 83607

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS
Richard S. Owen
P.O. Box 278
Nampa, ID 83653

:2:

0
C

f'-.. )

c::;,
...;::)

V~

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE ~RIER'S::t:(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS ~

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS
Department of Correction
Statehouse Mail
Boise, ID 83720

;g

State Insurance Fund
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0044

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

c:>~

-

C

]>

r-O

C

-

0<:
.::I J"lji

-3

WJ

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYERISURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING
ADDRESS)

,.

INDUSTRIAL~ECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
~

(NAME AND

Bridget A. Vaughan
2194 E. Roanoke Dr.
Boise, ID 83712

IT IS: (Check One)
Admitted

Denied

0

X

X
X

D
D

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.

0

X

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or
about the time claimed.

2. That the employer/employee relationship existed.

entirely

0

0

by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

N/A

N/A

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the
nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of
and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment.

X

D

6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given
to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of
the manifestation of such occupational disease.

X

D

7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to
Idaho Code, § 72-419: $

X

D

8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Act.

9. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
None

IC1003 (Rev. 1/0112004)

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)
Appendix 3

Answer-Page 1 of 2

~

onti nued from
10.

Stat.e with specifiCity what matters are

and your reason for denying liability, to(,

with any affirmative defenses.

Defendant further deny each and every allegation of Claimant's Workers' Compensation Complaint not specifically admitted herein.

Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy of your
Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail or by
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause
the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid.
Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.0., Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under
the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form I.C.
1002.
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE.

XNO

DYES

DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE.
No

Amount of Compensation Paid to Date

Dated

TID

PPI/PPO

-0-

-0-

PLEASE COM P LETE
I hereby certify that on the \

L\

A~\q t1D

Medical
-0-

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

\~t~ll1([J

,--)

t)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

day of April, 2010, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S
NAME AND ADDRESS

INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
(if applicable)

c/o Richard S. Owen, Esq.
P.O. Box 278
Nampa, 10 83653

via:

o

X

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

via:

o
o

personal service of process

via:

regular U.S. Mail

Sfgnatu '-'"

o
o

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

b
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOSEPH HENRY,
Claimant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
Employer,
and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2009-029710

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND RECOMMENDATION

F I LEO

INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the aboveentitled matter to Referee LaDawn Marsters, who conducted a hearing in Boise on February 14,
2011. Claimant, Joseph Henry, was present in person and represented by Richard S. Owen, of
Nampa. Defendant Employer, the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), and Defendant
Surety, the State Insurance Fund, were represented by Bridget A. Vaughan, of Boise, Idaho.
The parties presented oral and documentary evidence. Post-hearing depositions were taken and
briefs were later submitted. The matter came under advisement on May 20,2011.
ISSUES
By agreement ofthe parties, the issues set at the hearing to be decided are:
1.

Whether Claimant suffered an injury from an accident arising out of and in the
course of employment on November 15, 2009.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V, AND RECOMMENDATION - 1

2.

3.

Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits:
a.

Medical care;

b.

Temporary Partial and/or Temporary Total Disability benefits (TPD/TTD);

c.

Permanent Partial Impairment (PP!); and

d.

Disability in excess of impairment.

Whether Claimant is entitled to permanent total disability pursuant to the odd-lot
doctrine or otherwise.

4.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804.

5.

Whether the Commission should retain jurisdiction beyond the statute of
limitations.

The fourth and fifth issues were not addressed by either party in their briefs; therefore,
these issues are deemed waived.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

There is no dispute that Claimant suffered a heart attack on the morning of November 15,
2009. Claimant contends that his heart attack is a compensable injury because it was triggered
by walking quickly in the early morning below-freezing weather to reach his work post at Unit
15 while stressed due to running late. He further contends that Defendants are liable for benefits
related to his triple bypass surgery on November 26, 2009, as well as treatments related to
ensuing complications, pursuant to the doctrine of compensable consequences, because his heart
attack destabilized the network of arteries that had been successfully compensating for his
chronically occluded right coronary artery. Claimant seeks reimbursement for his medical care
as well as compensation for temporary total disability, and permanent whole person impairment
in the amount of 17% with no apportionment for any preexisting conditions.

In addition,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 2

Claimant argues that his heart attack pennanently exacerbated his preexisting anxiety disorder,
rendering him totally and pennanently disabled.
Defendants deny that Claimant suffered an injury from an accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment.

They assert Claimant's preexisting risk factors for cardiac

pathology including smoking, hypercholesterolemia, hypertension, anxiety disorder and sleep
apnea, and his own personal circumstances leading him to run late, are causative and, therefore,
his claim is not compensable. In addition, they argue that Claimant was not exposed to any
hazards at work that he was not also exposed to previously on that morning since he had not
engaged in any work activities before suffering his injury.
In the event Claimant's heart attack is found compensable, Defendants deny that it caused
his need for triple bypass surgery and assert that this procedure became necessary solely due to
Claimant's preexisting conditions. Under these circumstances, Defendants assert Claimant is
entitled to no more than medical and temporary disability benefits related to immediate care for
his November 15, 2009 heart attack.
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED
The record in this matter consists ofthe following:
1.

The Industrial Commission legal file;

2.

The pre-hearing deposition testimony of Claimant, taken September 15,2010, and
admitted into evidence as Defendants' Exhibit G;

3.

The testimony of Claimant and of his wife, Laura Henry, taken at the February
14,2011 hearing;

4.

Joint Exhibits 1 through 32 and Defendants' Exhibits A through H, admitted at
the hearing;

5.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Kevin R. Krafft, M.D., taken February
16,2011;

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 3

6.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Jon L. Hlavinka, M.D., taken February
23,2011;

7.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Bret R. Kimmel, taken February 25,
2011, and admitted into evidence pursuant to an agreement of the parties at
hearing;

8.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Aundrea Peaslee, LCPC, M.A., taken
March 3, 2011;

9.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Mark G. Parent, M.D., taken March 4,
2011;

10.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Craig W. Beaver, Ph.D., taken March
23,2011;

11.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D., taken March
23,2011;

12.

The post-hearing deposition testimony of Eric F. Holt, M.D., taken March 24,
2011.

OBJECTIONS
All pending obj ections are overruled.
After considering the above evidence and the arguments of the parties, the Referee
submits the following fmdings of fact and conclusions of law for review by the Commission.

FINDINGS OF FACT

INTRODUCTION
1.

Claimant was 58 years of age and residing in Caldwell at the time of the hearing.

He has a relevant history of risk factors for cardiac pathology including hypertension, anxiety
disorder, sleep apnea, hypercholesterolemia, and a family history of heart disease. Claimant took
medications for his hypertension, anxiety disorder and hypercholesterolemia and had a C-P AP
machine, which he used irregularly, for his sleep apnea. In addition, Claimant has been a smoker
since he was approximately 16. There have been some interruptions in Claimant's smoking

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 4

history, including a seven-year hiatus in the mid-1980's.

He started smoking agam m

approximately 1992 and by 2009 he was smoking 1 - 1 ~ packs per day. At the time of hearing
he was smoking % to 1 pack per day. Finally, unbeknownst to Claimant, his heart disease had
manifested in triple vessel coronary artery disease, including a totally occluded, but
collateralized, right coronary artery. A stress echocardiogram ordered in September 2008 to rule
out ischemia failed to detect this condition.
2.

From 2001 until March 2010, Claimant worked as a prison guard at the Idaho

State Correctional Institution ("ISCI"). On November 15, 2009, he suffered an acute myocardial
infarction ("heart attack") upon arrival at his duty post at approximately 6:30 a.m. Claimant
asserts his heart attack is a compensable accident because it was triggered by his activities at
work that morning.
3.

Mark G. Parent, M.D., Claimant's treating cardiologist, is the only medical expert

to provide an opinion as to the cause of Claimant's heart attack. He opined that it was triggered
by the early morning hour, Claimant's activities, his stress over being late for work, and the
freezing temperature to which he was exposed outside. On April 30, 2010, Dr. Parent wrote to
Claimant's attorney:
You had asked me in my opinion whether or not Mr. Henry's activities of that
morning, getting to work were a factor in causing his heart attack, and knowing
these other details of the temperature, the time of day, the activity level and the
mental stress he was under, I think it is quite likely that those factors contributed
to his myocardial infarction that day.

IE 12, p. 9.
4.

Claimant was exposed to similar risks of suffering a heart attack both before and

after his arrival at the work place. As noted above, Dr. Parent has proposed in his various
writings, and again in his deposition testimony, that Claimant's injuries are causally related to

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 5

the activities/events to which he was exposed following his arrival on the Employer's premises.
The threshold issue in this case is whether Dr. Parent's opinion in this regard is sufficient to meet
Claimant's burden of proving medical causation to a reasonable degree of medical probability.

MORNING OF NOVEMBER 15, 2009-PRE-ARRIVALACTIVITIES
5.

Claimant thought he was running a little behind schedule when he left for work,

but he could not recall any particular reason why. He hurried to get out of the house and on the
road. Tr., p. 111. He testified that the reason he was running late, whatever it might have been,
was purely personal and not work-related.
6.

Claimant's morning commute from Caldwell to south Boise took approximately

45 minutes. He started out in a car that had been parked outside all night. He described the
weather that morning as being "kind of brisk". Tr., p. 33. Claimant testified that he did not
remember anything out of the ordinary occurring that morning or along the way. No domestic
unrest, no car trouble, nothing memorable. He testified that he felt no untoward symptoms of
discomfort prior to his arrival at the prison.
However, Bret R. Kimmel, central control sergeant, testified that Claimant told
him during his recovery that he had symptoms on his way to work that he thought, in
retrospect, he should have paid attention to. Mr. Kimmel, the chairman of Employer's
morale task force, spoke to Claimant several times after his heart attack while he was
recovering. Mr. Kimmel testified:

Q. And then your second call, anything specific you remember about that as far
as the nature of the call in general?

A. Again, it was kind of a checkup, how are you doing? What's your recoveryyou know, what's it been like. In one of the conversations, you know, Officer
Henry was telling me that when he had come in to work that day he wasn't feeling
well. And, you know, kind of-during the drive and things like that, he should
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 6

have kind of paid attention to, I guess, his own feeling of-but that 'was after the
fact.
Q. And he was describing the heart attack that he'd suffered on November 15?

A. Yeah. He was referring to the morning coming to work on the 15 th . • . .

Kimmel Dep., pp. 11-12.

Mr. Kimmel's testimony was taken in a post-hearing deposition

through the parties' agreement.
7.

Similarly, in an April 6, 2010 letter to Dr. Parent prepared based upon Claimant's

reports ("the April 6 letter"), Claimant's attorney wrote, "By the time Mr. HeillY got to the first
administration building he did not feel very good, kind of had a general feeling of malaise, but
had no specific symptoms." JE 13, p. 1.
MORNING OF NOVEMBER 15, 2009 - POST-ARRIVAL ACTIVITIES
8.

Upon arrival at the prison, Claimant parked his car and walked 75 yards or so to

the first security gate, then another 20 yards or so to the Administration Building, where he
underwent a routine inspection. At this point, a coworker commented that Claimant looked
unwell. The unnamed coworker did not testify, but at his deposition, Claimant related what the
coworker said:
A. [Spontaneously] I was reminded by one of my fellow workers there [at the
Administration Building] that I didn't - - they told me I didn't look very good.
Q. At this point when you were checking in with the shift lieutenant or his
designee?
A. Yes.
Q. So on the day in question someone that was assigned to that duty mentioned to
you didn't look well?

A. They said I didn't look very well.
Q. They reminded me. I had forgotten completely about it but ... [end of
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 7

response].
Claimant Dep., pp. 70-71.
9.

Claimant's testimony, however, paints a different picture about how he was

feeling. At his deposition, he first testified that he was fine:

A. I came into the Administration Building, went through the control security
doors and approached the lieutenant and checked in for the day's work. And
they looked at me and kind of - - I forget the details of what they said. It was
- - they expressed, "How you doing?" You know, "You okay? Good to go?
Ready to go to work?" I don't know what the details were, but they - Q. Would that have been extraordinary or just what they normally do on any
given day?

A. It's a caring thing, you know, a good supervisor should know how his men are
doing.
Q. Okay.

A. So I checked in, I told them, "I'm fine. Let's go." And it's just another - - as
far as I was concerned it's just another workday.

Id. at pp. 74-75. When pressed, however, Claimant explained that he did not remember what
took place in the Administration Building:
Q. So at that point in time, as you're checking in with the lieutenant in the Admin
Building, you were - - absolutely no physical symptoms at all?

A. The lieutenant or his designee - - I don't recall ifI was sweating or having
serious problems of any type. I do know I was there ready to go to work.
Q. Do you remember having any minor problems at all?

A. Just let's get with the program, time to go to work.
Q. So is your response to my question that you were having no symptoms of any
sort, no physical difficulties, whether minor or major at the time that you were
entering the Admin Building and checking in with the lieutenant or his
designee?

A. I don't know completely. That was some time ago. I've been through a lot.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 8

Id. at pp. 75-76. Then, at the hearing on February 14, 2011, Claimant again testified that he was
feeling fme when he arrived at the Administration Building:

Q. Okay. When you get into the first building, Mr. Henry, how were you
feeling?
A. Not bad.

Q. Nothing unusual?
A. No, as far as I was concerned it was just another day at work.
Tr., pp. 34-35.
10.

Once inside the Administration Building, Claimant passed through a second

secured area before exiting outside to walk to his post at Unit 15.

Claimant described the

distance and grade ofthe walk:
Q. Can you estimate for me how long that walk is? What's the distance?
A. Oh, I can't be exact, of course, but I would put it at 500 yards, maybe 600
yards. 1
Q. Then when you get to your work unit what happens?
A. By the way, there's slight inclines and slight declines, and there's prison
population around on a small scale.
Q. Okay. And then you reach your unit, and then what happens?
A. Well, they have inclines, and you go up and down there walking across all
these different slopes. And when you've reached the front of the
unit. .. [remainder of response omitted].
Claimant's Dep., pp. 72-73. At the hearing, Claimant estimated the distance to be 500 yards.
Based upon Claimant's prior representations, Claimant's attorney represented in his April 6 letter
to Dr. Parent that the walkway is 450 yards long. Mr. Kimmel testified that the walkway is

I Claimant's counsel asserted the distance was 450 yards in an April 6, 2010 letter to Dr. Parent seeking a
causation opinion. Claimant's counsel speaks for Claimant, so it is presumed Claimant provided this information,
which is inconsistent with his deposition testimony.
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about a quarter-mile (440 yards) long and flat.
11.

On arrival, Claimant walked up steps to enter Unit 15. He testified that there are

six steps. Mr. Kimmel testified there are three.
12.

When Claimant arrived at the control room at Unit 15, he sat down to rest.

Coworkers commented that he looked kind of funny. Claimant responded, "Oh, I think it was
just because I was in a hurry corning down the breezeway," and sat down to rest. Claimant's
Dep., p. 80. The April 6 letter states, "By the time Mr. Henry got to the front door of the second
building, he was sweating profusely and his co-workers immediately asked ifhe was alright." JE
13, p. 1.
13.

Claimant thought he would be fine but, after sitting for 15 minutes, he thought he

may be having a heart attack. His symptoms were escalating to include left arm pain and chest
heaviness. After 30 minutes he was convinced he was having a heart attack so he asked someone
to send for medical assistance.
14.

Claimant was examined by onsite medical personnel, then taken by ambulance to

St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center. At the prison, he asked for, and took, a nitroglycerin
pill. Other than checking in at the security gates and ambulating to his post, Claimant did not
perform any activities at Employer's that morning.

MEDICAL CARE AND RECOVERY
15.

At the hospital, Claimant was diagnosed with an acute posterolateral myocardial

infarction due to a blockage of the right circumflex obtuse marginal artery. Mark G. Parent,
M.D., a cardiologist, performed an emergency circumflex ejection thrombectomy and placed a
stent. Dr. Parent discovered at that time that Claimant's right coronary artery was chronically
occluded but completely collateralized by other vessels. He believed it was noncontributory to

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 10
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Claimant's November 15 cardiac complaints. On the following day, Claimant was still having
chest pain, the etiology of which was unclear.

A diagnostic cardiac catheterization showed

Claimant's stent to be widely patent and confirmed that his right coronary artery occlusion was
chronic. Otherwise, it failed to identify a cause for Claimant's symptoms. Dr. Parent concluded:
This patient's chest pain is not due to aortic dissection. His shoulder and back
pain I suspect might be more musculoskeletal. He does exhibit some pain seeking
type procedure. The patient has clearly had an infarct but I do not believe it is a
significant event for him. This could have actually been washout from the
diagonal artery intervention rather than any complication from that. Regardless,
the patient is hemodynamically stable, angiographically looks well and continues
to complain of shoulder pain, which I think now at this point must be presumed to
be nonischemic.
JE 11, p. 12.
16.

Claimant was discharged on November 17, 2009.

On November 25, 2009,

Claimant underwent a treadmill test, which induced ventricular tachycardia.

After further

testing, Claimant was diagnosed with severe triple-vessel coronary artery disease. On November
26, 2009, Claimant underwent a non-emergent triple bypass by Andrew Forbes, M.D., a cardiac
surgeon. This surgery was followed by complications including pleural and cardiac effusions
requiring further invasive procedures.
17.

After his cardiac procedures and a course of cardiac rehabilitation, Claimant

attempted light duty work for Employer. He was unable to continue doing this work primarily
due to anxiety from being around prisoners. He resigned in March 2010. Claimant has not been
employed since then.

CARDIAC OPINION
18.

Dr. Parent continued to treat Claimant following his heart attack and bypass

surgery. The April 6 letter provided facts he should assume in developing his causation opinion:
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Mr. Henry arrived for work on the morning of November 15, 2009, very early,
about 6:30 a.m. Mr. Henry tells me that it was below freezing, dark and windy ...
Mr. Henry was late to work and got out of his car and walked quickly to the first
building which Mr. Henry tells me is approximately 75 to [sic] 100 yards away
from the parking lot. By the time Mr. Henry got to the first administration
building he did not feel very good, kind of had a general feeling of malaise, but
had no specific symptoms.
Mr. Henry went in to the administration building where it was nice and warm and
went through a check through process required by his employer. He then went
back outside and walked as fast as he could another 450 yards to a second
building. Mr. Henry tells me that he was late to work, worried about his job, and
walked as fast as he could this last 450 yards in the cold weather.
By the time Mr. Henry got to the front door of the second building, he was
sweating profusely and his co-workers immediately asked if he was alright. Mr.
Henry indicates that he was taken to a break room and sat down. Over the next
half hour, he continued to sweat profusely, his heart was racing, and these
symptoms continually and gradually got worse ...

IE 13, pp. 1-2. The letter asks Dr. Parent for his " ... medical opinion about whether or not the
activities Mr. Henry engaged in that morning in getting to work were a factor in causing his heart
attack at the time and place when he experienced it." Id. at p. 2 (emphasis added). It also
encouraged Dr. Parent to couch his response in terms of reasonable medical probability.
19.

On April 30, 2010, Dr. Parent responded:

I was aware of some of the details of his activities, but not the more intricate
details that you have summarized for me. These include that on the morning of
the 15th of November 2009 when he arrived to work at 6:30 a.m., it was below
freezing, dark, windy and cold and he had to get out of his car and because he was
late for work, walk quickly into the first building of a distance of 75-100 yards.
He did not feel very good after that walk and once he got in the warmth of the
building, he felt a little malaise but he went through the administration building
and through the check-in process. Then he had to walk outside and as fast as he
could, walk another 450 yards to the second building, again because he was late
for work.
When he got to the door of the second building, he was sweating profusely and he
looked ill and his coworkers inquired as to his condition and he had to sit down in
the break room. For the next one-half hour he began to sweat profusely with his
heart feeling like it was racing and the symptoms gradually worsened and
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 12
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worsened. He eventually came to the emergency room and was found to have a
heart attack, the details of which are recorded in the medical record.
You had asked me in my opinion whether or not Mr. Henry's activities of that
morning, getting to work were a factor in causing his heart attack, and knowing
these other details of the temperature, the time of day, the activity level and the
mental stress he was under, I think it is quite likely that those factors contributed
to his myocardial infarction that day.
JE 12, p. 9. Notably, Dr. Parent did not figure any of Claimant's pre-arrival activities into his
April 30, 2010 opinion. He apparently assumed Claimant's general feeling of malaise was due to
his walk from his car to the Administration Building even though the April 6 letter does not
represent when Claimant began feeling this way. Moreover, Dr. Parent was unaware of the
statements attributed to Claimant by Mr. Kimmel that Claimant had felt unwell during his drive
to work.
20.

Defendants also sought Dr. Parent's oplillon.

On September 30, 2010, they

provided Dr. Parent with some of Claimant's pre-heart attack medical records and asked directed
questions. Dr. Parent replied on October 25, 2010, outlining Claimant's risk factors and likely
triggers:
It is clear from the medical literature that longstanding tobacco abuse,
hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, along with more minor risk factors of
obstructive sleep apnea and anxiety, may lead to a developing atherosclerotic
process and the development of a vulnerable atherosclerotic plaque. That plaque
then needs some sort of trigger to lead to acute thrombotic heart attack like the
one [Claimant] suffered on November 15,2009. A likely trigger for heart attacks
is often early morning exertion under cold temperatures, along with the stress and
anxiety of going to work. As you know, [Claimant] has had a very difficult time
handling daily life stressors and has required treatment with anxiolytics and
antidepressants for a number of years.

JE 12, p. 2. Dr. Parent awkwardly explained that Claimant's early morning walking in the cold
weather likely triggered his heart attack:
I would think that the patient had a 50% contribution to his myocardial infarction
from his longstanding risk factors mentioned above and 50% due to the acute
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 13

~

provoking risk factors of early morning walking in the cold weather to work.
Therefore, I would agree with you that it is equally likely that the heart attack
could have been caused by either the longstanding risk factors that caused the
development of an atherosclerotic plaque and then the triggering risk factors of
that morning's activities.
JE 12, pp. 2-3.
21.

Dr. Parent's oplIDons were further developed at the time of his post hearing

deposition. On direct examination, he testified as follows concerning the cause of Claimant's
myocardial infarction:

Q. All right, sir. You've indicated in letters to myself and to counsel that when
Mr. Henry was late to work, he was hurrying in from a warm building to the cold
outside; that the physical stress of that exercise triggered his heart attack. Can
you explain, Doctor, the effect of cold weather on the efficiency of a heart and
how that works? What I'm thinking, Doctor, is we always here [sic] in the winter
of people who are out shoveling snow and have heart attacks, and I was
wondering if you could help us understand why.
A. We know that the arteries are very dynamic in their size and under certain
stimuli they will constrict. And cold weather and anxiety cause constriction ofthe
artery size so it narrows the channel.

We also know that mental stress, anxiety, exercise, and cold weather, blood
pressure goes up, which puts a hemodynamic stress on the artery, increases the
need for oxygen to the heart muscle. So at the same time flow needs to be
augmented, there's now a reduction of flow because of constriction.
We also know that the hemodynamic stress and probably other factors that are
hormonal related to release of certain hormones during stress and anxiety can
cause an atherosclerotic plaque to rupture.

Q. All right. Do you continue to believe, Dr. Parent, that Mr. Henry's physical
exertion against the setting of his underlying personality was the factor and the
cause of his heart attack on the morning of November 15 of2009?
A. I believe it was a factor.
Parent Dep., pp. 42-44.
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22.

On cross-examination, Dr. Parent initially reiterated his belief that it was

Claimant's post-arrival activities that were implicated in the cause of his myocardial infarction.
Parent Dep., pp. 48-49. However, further questioning by defense counsel demonstrated that Dr.
Parent's opinion on the issue of causation is dependent upon the assumptions he made
concerning Claimant's pre- and post-arrival activities of November 15. At first, Dr. Parent
acknowledged that sometimes heart attacks occur spontaneously, without any apparent
precipitating trigger. He then testified that scientific research has established a causal connection
between certain activities/events and the occurrence of a heart attack:
A. ... But we also do know through scientific research and studies, as we
discussed, that there are certain triggers that we identify with an acute myocardial
infarction and have been shown. So we have some basis and scientific knowledge
that there are triggers more likely to trigger the heart attack at certain times of the
day and with certain kinds of activity and certain kinds of stress.

So you can never be a hundred percent sure that these were the trigger, but you
can only make the conclusion that because the heart attack occurred on that day,
and those activities were occurring at that time, and those events were occurring,
that there has to be some contribution to that heart attack on that day. 'Cause why
that day? Why not another day?
It's only through that basic science knowledge that we say that it's probable that
those are contributing factors. Were they the sole cause? No. But they were
contributors.
Parent Dep., p. 50. Dr. Parent was then asked on cross-examination to make some additional
assumptions concerning the nature of Claimant's activities of November 15:
Q. Would your opinion with respect to causation change under a slightly different
factual scenario, if the facts established that Mr. Henry commuted from Caldwell
to his work; that on the morning in question he was aware he was running late
while still in Caldwell prior to reporting for work at the correctional facility; that
he entered a vehicle that had not been warmed up, that had been parked outside,
presumably was exposed to the same temperatures in Caldwell, or close to the
same temperatures, and on route to Boise, although in a vehicle, and was aware he
was late during that commute, do you think any of those factors may have caused
the onset ofthe myocardial infarction that morning?
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Parent Dep., p. 51.
His response is illuminating and is worth quoting at length:
A. It's a little bit like bending a stick and saying, when is the breaking point
going to occur? You hear it crack, you hear it pop, you see some splinters, you
see some fibers, and then the thing breaks.
So is there a time when he's been exposed to the scenario that you described, is
that leading up to or helping prepare this artery for this occasion, is this a
contributor to it, it really becomes into fine points that are so difficult to be factual
or scientifically based that you just can't distinguish that exact degree of
contribution.
We don't know what's going on inside that artery. Was that artery - had a small
plaque rupture during that time when he first got in the car? Was it happening as
he was driving? Was it little bits of splitting of that atherosclerotic cap? Were
things beginning to develop back then?
With any scientific certainty you can't answer that question. You can't say that
you know that that was happening. What scientifically you can say is when the
onset of symptoms occurred, the artery at that time did close, and the heart attack
began at that time.
But can you say where along that day or the day before what was stressing his
system, when was this - when was the inevitable day that this thing was going to
happen? You have to look at it, I think, major stressors and minor stressors.
And if I look at things, you know, the cold car, the cold steering wheel, the
driving through the traffic, were those stressors that were contributing? They
likely could have been, should have been, you know, considered. But can you how far can you dissect that down? That's where I get in trouble of dissecting
down all those, you know, minute events that begin to occur.
And I can't go that fme for you as you'd like me to be in discerning which was
the one, was it the cold car, the steering wheel, the traffic, the getting out?
Certainly in his perception, at the time of my history taking with him, during the
time of it and then subsequently going into more depth afterwards, he didn't relate
to me those events.
And so in his perception it was really, you know, I was going quickly and it was
cold, and those are the things I remember. So I can't pin that down to you in a
certainty the preceding earlier in the - preceding events earlier in the day that
contributed to that, what percent. Very difficult for me to give you a discrete,
scientifically based answer.
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Q. So the opinion that you previously gave was based on the history that Mr.
Henry provided to you?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Would your opinion at all be affected by evidence which suggested he
appeared to be ill when he went through the check-in station, the first building he
entered that day after coming from the parking lot?
A. I think a nonmedical person looking at someone who's late to work and who's
under stress might easily make a judgment on somebody's health. Mr. Henry is
an anxious person who displays that anxiety on his sleeve and you see that in him.

For you to ask me what's the contribution of the cold morning getting in the car
and the drive to Boise is for me too fine a point to be so accurate to give you an
opinion on what contribution - I just can't give that.
Parent Dep., pp. 52-55.
23.

The sense that emerges from the quoted testimony is that blockage of the artery

immediately leads to symptoms typically associated with a myocardial infarction. Therefore,
one can determine when the blockage occurred by looking to the onset of symptomatology.
However, Dr. Parent was much more circumspect about identifying the event or events which
made the occurrence of the blockage inevitable. It is impossible, in other words, to say whether
the inciting events that led to the plaque rupture occurred prior to Claimant's arrival on the
premises, or subsequent thereto.

For example, Dr. Parent acknowledged that anxiety is

associated with myocardial infarction, but Claimant was anxious about being late both before
and after his arrival. The time of day is also an important factor, but all the things that happened
prior to the myocardial infarction occurred during the early morning hours of November 15. The
Referee appreciates that Claimant's post-arrival activities included certain activities that
Claimant did not perform until he arrived at the worksite. One must suppose that the walk from
his car, to the administration building, to his job site was more physically demanding than the act
of piloting his vehicle from Caldwell to the premises. However, though mindful of all these
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDATION - 17
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facts, Dr. Parent was unable to opine which of these activities/events made it inevitable that
Claimant would suffer the November 15 thrombosis when he did.
24.

Further, Dr. Parent was unaware that Claimant told Mr. Kimmel he suspected

something was wrong on the drive to work or that a coworker thought he looked unwell on
arrival at the Administration Building. He presumed that Claimant exhibited no onset symptoms
until he reached Unit 15; however, the evidence in the record suggests Claimant may have been
experiencing onset symptoms before then. Because Dr. Parent failed to consider this evidence,
his opinion lacks foundation.
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

25.

The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally

construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793
P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88,910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). Facts, however,
need not be construed liberally in favor of the worker when evidence is conflicting. Aldrich v.
Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363,834 P.2d 878,880 (1992).
CREDIBILITY

26.

Claimant.

A claimant's credibility is generally at issue in a workers'

compensation proceeding. The scrutiny in this case is heightened because two psychologists
have opined that, after his heart attack, Claimant likely magnified his symptoms for purposes of
secondary gain, either financial or to avoid working at the prison. Similarly, Dr. Parent noted on
Claimant's first hospital admittance that he was magnifying his symptoms.

In addition,

Claimant's testimony with respect to whether he may have been having symptoms of a heart
attack before he arrived at work on November 15, 2009 at his deposition and at the hearing is
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internally inconsistent (he alternately testifies that he was just fine on arrival and that he cannot
remember his condition). It is also inconsistent with Mr. Kimmel's testimony (that Claimant told
him he should have paid attention to his pre-arrival symptoms), the unnamed coworker's
observation (that Claimant looked unwell on arrival) and his attorney's representation to Dr.

.

Parent (that he was experiencing general malaise at the Administration Building).
27.

The Referee finds insufficient evidence to establish that Claimant intentionally

failed to report or underreported symptoms consistent with a heart attack that he may have been
experiencing before he arrived at work or was otherwise outrightly untruthful about his
symptoms. After all, he did admit that a coworker commented he looked unwell on arrival at the
Administration Building. However, there is some evidence that Claimant over-emphasized facts
he believes would help his case, including his exaggeration of the distance and grade changes
between the Administration Building and Unit 15.
28.

The

evidence

of Claimant's

self-advocacy,

though understandable,

IS

confounding. Given this, the psychological and medical opinions and the inconsistent evidence
Claimant has proffered on some pointed key questions about his pre-arrival condition, the
Referee fmds Claimant's firsthand testimony as to his physical symptoms before he arrived at
Unit 15 is unreliable and, therefore, lacks credibility.
29.

The balance of Claimant's relevant testimony, excepting his estimate of the

distance and grade of the walk to Unit 15 from the Administration Building, bears adequate
indicia of reliability and is, therefore, credible.
DOES CLAIMANT'S HEART ATTACK CONSTITUTE A COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT?

30.

The term "accident" is a term of art under Idaho law, and is defined at

I.e.

§ 72-

102(18)(b) as follows:
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"Accident" means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be
reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury.
In meeting his burden of proof, Claimant need not identify, with any great specificity, the time

when and place where the accident occurred. All that Claimant is required to do is to reasonably
locate the occurrence of the accident in time and space. Here, Claimant has alleged that the
injurious event took place at some point in time between his arrival on the premises, and the
onset of symptomatology later that morning. These assertions, if true, would be sufficient to
meet Claimant's burden of reasonably locating the time and place of the accident.
31.

Nor, is it problematic to Claimant's case that he is unable to allege any unusual

occurrence on the morning of November 15. Idaho case law makes it clear that an accident can
occur when claimant is engaged in the usual and ordinary tasks of his employment when his
ability to resist injury is overcome by those tasks. See Wynn v. J R. Simplot Company, 105
Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983); Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 109 P.3d 1084
(2005).
32.

The activities in which Claimant engaged following his arrival on the premises

were clearly activities which arose out of his employment even though his employment might
not have resulted in a greater exposure to these activities than he experienced apart from his
employment. See Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002); Vawter v.

United Parcel Services, Inc., IC 2010-000114 (2011).

In Vawter, the issue before the

Commission was whether a back injury suffered by Claimant as he bent over to tie his shoes was
the result of a risk which "arose" out of his employment.

Relying on Spivey, supra, the

Commission ruled that since the risk to which Claimant was exposed was a risk created by his
employment, the accident was one which arose out of Claimant's employment. Application of
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that rule to the facts of this case yields the same result; the risk to which Claimant was ostensibly
exposed (cold weather and the exertion associated with walking to his worksite), were risks of
injury created by his employment, notwithstanding that Claimant might have been exposed to
similar risks apart from his employment.
33.

In Vawter, medical causation was conceded. Medical causation, however, is the

central dispute in this matter. Therefore, conceding that the alleged "accident" in this case is one
which could be said to arise out of and in the course of Claimant's employment, Claimant
nevertheless bears the burden of establishing that the post-arrival events of November 15 are
responsible for causing the myocardial infarction he suffered that morning.
34.

In addressing the question of causation in this case, a pivotal issue is

ascertainment of when the thrombosis actually occurred. Obviously, if the circumflex artery
blockage occurred prior to Claimant's arrival at the workplace, it is impossible to associate that
event with his post-arrival activities.

Since it is the blockage of the artery that produces

symptomatology, it should be possible, as Dr. Parent has noted, to ascertain when the blockage
occurred, by determining when the symptomatology began.
35.

Dr. Parent has supposed that the blockage occurred after Claimant arrived on the

premises, and there is evidence in the record to support the proposition that Claimant's
symptoms worsened considerably following his arrival at the worksite. Specifically, Dr. Parent
considered Claimant's exertional activities after he arrived at work including walking 75 yards
from his car to a security checkpoint, walking another 25 yards into the Administration Building,
waiting while his belongings were inspected, walking through the Administration Building
where he passed through another security checkpoint, then walking as fast as he could for 450
yards until he reached Unit 15, where he climbed stairs.
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36.

However, there is also testimony of record which would suggest an onset of

symptomatology prior to Claimant's arrival on the premises. In this regard, recall that Mr.
Kimmel testified that Claimant reported feeling unwell during his drive to the prison and a
coworker commented that he looked unwell on arrival at the Administration Building. Further,
Dr. Parent did not consider Claimant's pre-work exertional activities, although he agreed they
were likely contributory. In fact, Dr. Parent neither discounted nor quantified any other of the
morning's activities in terms of their contribution to the closure of the affected artery at that
point in time. At one juncture, Dr. Parent even implied that activities from the day before could
have put processes in motion that made Claimant's heart attack on November 15 inevitable.
37.

Considering the totality of the evidence, even the fact of Claimant's worsened

post-arrival condition ultimately fails to establish that the injurious event which ultimately
caused the blockage occurred after Claimant arrived at the worksite.
38.

Dr. Parent has testified that the time of day is a relevant factor in determining the

cause of Claimant's myocardial infarction. He testified that scientific research has established
that myocardial infarctions are more likely to occur during the early morning hours. However,
Claimant's pre-arrival and post-arrival activities all occurred during the early morning hours of
November 15th, thus blunting the significance of the time of day in connecting Claimant's
myocardial infarction to the demands of his employment.
39.

Next, Dr. Parent commented on the significance of the psychological stress of

being late to work as a factor contributing to the November 15 th myocardial infarction. Again,
however, this factor obtained both with respect to Claimant's pre-arrival and post-arrival
activities. There is no compelling reason to suppose that the fear of being late stressed Claimant
any more after he arrived on the premises, than before he got there. It is also worth noting that
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there is conflicting evidence on the question of actually how stressed the Claimant was by
running a few minutes late, and whether he was, in fact, late at all. (See, Claimant's Dep. pp. 7677, 79; Tr. pp. 37-38).
40.

Finally, Dr. Parent testified that research has shown that cold temperature is

implicated in contributing to the onset of myocardial infarction. Here, Claimant has testified that
on the morning of November 15, 2009, it was "brisk." He stepped out of his Caldwell horne,
started his car and drove to the prison. The record does not reflect how Claimant was dressed,
whether appropriately or inappropriately for the conditions. There is no testimony that even
though it was cold outside, Claimant was himself cold. In fact, Claimant testified that he was
comfortable. Claimant's Dep., p. 83. On balance, the evidence is insufficient to establish that
Claimant was actually exposed to any risk of vasoconstriction due to cold temperatures. Even if
he was, the evidence shows he was exposed to this risk both before and after his arrival at the
premises.
41.

The Referee finds Dr. Parent's testimony insufficient to establish that any of

Claimant's activities at his workplace on November 15, 2009 triggered his heart attack because
he failed to rule out the earlier morning activities.

He acknowledged that he should have

considered Claimant's earlier activities including getting into a cold car, gripping a cold steering
wheel and driving through traffic to get to work but, nevertheless, he did not. To the extent Dr.
Parent's opinion relies upon Claimant's exertional activities at work to establish an industrial
accident, it is materially flawed because it fails to rule out Claimant's prior exertional activities
that morning.
42.

The Referee finds Claimant has failed to establish to a reasonable medical

probability that his heart attack was triggered by his activities at work on November 15, 2009. In
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the final analysis, Dr. Parent's testimony is insufficient to establish that Claimant's post-arrival
activities were responsible for causing or contributing to the occurrence of Claimant's
myocardial infarction. Parent Dep., pp. 52-55.

The evidence just as easily supports the

proposition that it was something that happened prior to Claimant's arrival at the worksite that
made his heart attack inevitable and caused it to occur when and how it did. 2 Having failed to
establish a requisite causal relationship between his employment and the November 15
myocardial infarction, all other issues are moot.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Claimant has failed to prove that he suffered an industrial accident.

2.

All other issues are moot.

Even assuming that Claimant's myocardial infarction is causally related to his post-arrival activities, it is by no
means clear that Claimant's need for coronary bypass surgery is a natural and probable consequence of the
November 15 myocardial infarction. Dr. Parent testified that, at most, the myocardial infarction provided the
opportunity to discover Claimant's pre-existing right coronary artery blockage and other areas of concem which
were addressed at the time of the 3-way bypass surgery. Although it is true that.Dr. Parent has speculated that as a
result of the myocardial infarction, a small clot slipped into the collateralized bed perfusing the territory normally
perfused by the occluded right coronary artery, such that Claimant exhibited symptoms in that area during the
November 25 stress test, Dr. Parent made it clear that this was only speculation and that there were many other
theories that could explain Claimant's performance on the stress test which did not require some contribution from
the November 15 myocardial infarction. On balance, and read as a whole, Dr. Parent's testimony fails to establish,
to a reasonable degree of medical probability, that the November 15 myocardial infarction bears any relationship to
the Claimant's need for the subsequent 3-way bypass procedure.
2
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RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Referee
recommends that the Commission adopt such findings and conclusions as its own and issue an
appropriate final order.

DATED this

~~ay of ~ 2011.
IND

F

COMMISSION

~\·W
..--"<......

.~

LaDawn Marsters, Refere~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I hereby certify that on the '15 day of
, 2011, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONtLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDATION was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the following:
RICHARD S OWEN
PO BOX 278
NAMPA ID 83653-0278
BRIDGET A VAUGHAN
1001 N 22ND ST
BOISE ID 83702-3222
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOSEPH HENRY,
Claimant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,
Employer,

STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Surety,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2009-029710

ORDER

F' lED

JUL 1 5 2011
'NDUSTRiAL

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-717, Referee LaDawn Marsters submitted the record in the
above-entitled matter, together with her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
members of the Idaho Industrial Commission for their review.

Each of the undersigned

Commissioners has reviewed the record and the recommendations of the Referee.
Commission concurs with these recommendations.

The

Therefore, the Commission approves,

confirms, and adopts the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as its own.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That:
1. Claimant has failed to prove that he suffered and industrial accident.
2. All other issue are moot.
3. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all issues
adjudicated.

ORDER-l

DATEDthis~dayof S~

,2011.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
(

~~~

Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner

participated but did not sign

R.D. Maynard, Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

.--.--~~

I hereby certify that on the
') day of
,2011, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order wa,s served by regular United Sta es Mall upon each of the followmg
persons:
RICHARD S OWEN
PO BOX 278
NAMPA ID 83653-0278
BRIDGET A VAUGHAN
1001 N 22ND ST
BOISE ID 83702-3222

sm

ORDER-2

RICHARD S. OWEN, ESQ. (ISB #2687)
206 Twelfth Avenue Road
Post Office Box 278
Nampa, Idaho 83653
Telephone: (208) 466-8700
Attorney for Claimant!Appellant

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JOSEPH HENRY,

Claimant/Appellant,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

EmployerlRespondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I. C. No. 2009-029710

NOTICE OF APPEAL
'

...."}
'.

)

and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

SuretylRespondent,

)
)
)
)

,.

...D

)

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED SURETY AND EMPLOYER, by and through their attorney of
record, Bridget A. Vaughan, Boise, Idaho and THE CLERK OF THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
COMlv([SSION.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-named Appellant, JOSEPH HENRY, hereby

appeals against the above-named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final order of
the Industrial Commission entered in the above-entitled action on the 15th day of July, 2011.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED as follows:

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- PG. 1

1.

The party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgements and!or

orders described above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11(d).
2.

The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25 (A) I.A.R. is requested;

3.

The Appellant requests the fo llowing documents to be included in the agency's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.:
(a)

All briefs filed by the parties including exhibits and attachments thereto and the
original decision herein;

(b)

All deposition transcripts lodged with the Commission;

(c)

All exhibits admitted into evidence.

4.

I certify;

(a)

That the Industrial Commission has been paid the estimated fee of$100.00 for

preparation of the transcript;
(b)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the agency's record has been paid;

(c)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(d)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served, pursuant to Rule

20.
DATED This

~ day of July, 2011.
~
_ _ _L_~
___
By: _ _ _ _ _
Richard S. Owen

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- PG. 2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ::;? day of July, 2011, I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing instrument, postage prepaid, to the following:
Bridget A. Vaughan
1001 N. 22nd St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
by causing the same to be deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, enclosed in an
envelope addressed as above set forth.

NOTICE OF APPEAL -- PG. 3
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
/\. c.,: I \
-i,

JOSEPH HENRY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Claimant!Appellant,
v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,
DefendantslRespondents.

SUPREME COURT

No.391231

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission, Chairman, Thomas E.
Limbaugh, presiding.

Case Number:

IC 2009-02971 0

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation, filed July 15, 2011; and Order,
filed July 15,2011.

Attorney for Appellant:

Richard S. Owen

Attorney for Respondents:

Bridget A. Vaughan

Appealed By:

Department of Corrections and State Insurance
Fund, Defendants

Appealed Against:

Joseph Henry

Notice of Appeal Filed:

July 29,2011

Appellate Fee Paid:

$86.00

Name of Reporter:

M. Dean Willis

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
has been\B\~aT;~at~d filed with the Commission.

Dated:

FI ED - ORIG1NAL
AUG - 2. 20\\
suprLem-e~co-urt-:--A;:::CToS:7.:urtb:>iU~{jal;h:.
Enlilred on

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

'C(
, .....•' \l,.\I\L
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CERTIFICATION

I, SHELLY R. NYGARD, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal fIled June 29, 2011; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Recommendation; and Order entered July 15, 2011, herein, and the whole thereof.

IN VlITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of

CERTIFICATION -1

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOSEPH HENRY,

)
)
)
)

Claimant!Appellant,

)

~

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,
DefendantslRespondents.

SUPREME COURT NO. 39039
AMENDED
CERTllITCATEOFAPPEAL

)
)
)
)
)

Appeal From:

Industrial Commission,
Limbaugh, presiding.

Case Number:

IC 2009-02971 0

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation, filed July 15, 2011; and Order,
filed July 15, 2011.

Attorney for Appellant:

Richard S. Owen

Attorney for Respondents:

Bridget A. Vaughan

Appealed By:

Joseph Henry

Appealed Against:

Department of Corrections and State Insurance
Fund, Defendants

Notice of Appeal Filed:

July 29,2011

Appellate Fee Paid:

$86.00

Name of Reporter:

M. Dean Willis

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
has been prepared and filed with the Commission.

Dated:

AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1

Chairman,

Thomas E.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
JOSEPH HENRY,

)
)
)
)

Claimant'Appellant,

)

~

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Employer,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety,
DefendantslRespondents.

TO:

SUPREME COURT NO. 39039-2011

NOTICE OF COMPLETION

)
)
)
)
)

STEPHEN KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and
RICHARD S. OWEN for the Appellants; and
BRIDGET A. V AUGHAN for the Respondent.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each ofthe following:
RICHARD S OWEN
PO BOX 278
NAMPA ID 83653-0278

BRIDGET A VAUGHAN
2194 E ROANOKE DR
BOISE ID 83712

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.
In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled.
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this

NOTICE OF COMPLETION - 1

